This paper provides a thorough analysis of oligopolistic markets with positive demand-side network externalities and perfect compatibility. The minimal structure imposed on the model primitives is such that industry output increases in a …rm's rivals'total output as well as in the expected network size. This leads to a generalized equilibrium existence treatment that includes guarantees for a nontrivial equilibrium, and some insight into possible multiplicity of equilibria.
Introduction
It has often been observed that the nature of competition is qualitatively di¤erent in network industries. The presence of interdependencies in consumers'purchasing decisions induces demandside economies of scale that highly a¤ect market behavior and performance. When such e¤ects prevail, be they of the snob or bandwagon type, purchase decisions are strongly in ‡uenced by buyers'expectations, leading to behavior not encompassed by traditional demand theory (Veblen, 1899 and Leibenstein, 1950) .
From an industrial organization perspective, these distinctive features raise new questions and impose some challenges from a methodological perspective. In their pioneering work on markets with network e¤ects, Katz and Shapiro (1985) developed the concept of ful…lled expectations Cournot equilibrium, which was widely adopted. The resulting literature on the topic has established a number of results that distinguish network markets from ordinary markets. 1 The purpose of the present paper is to provide a thorough theoretical investigation of markets with homogeneous goods and network externalities, which uni…es and extends the existing studies and tackles a number of new issues of interest that were either not previously addressed or only partially studied. We consider oligopolistic competition amongst …rms in a market characterized by positive (direct) network e¤ects when the products of the …rms are perfectly compatible with each other, so the relevant network is industry-wide. While the current literature is more concerned with the case of …rm-speci…c networks, three arguments justify our choice. First, several important industries …t the perfect compatibility framework, in particular those in the telecommunications sector, such as fax machines and phones, but also many classical industries such as fashion, automobiles, entertainment, etc... 2 Second, there are still several outstanding issues, which, although addressed in the growing literature on network externalities, have not been fully articulated from a modeling perspective, and thus remain less than fully understood from a theoretical standpoint.
Third, a good understanding of the single network case can shed quite some light on the incentives for compatibility faced by …rms in the case of …rm-speci…c networks.
In its unifying scope, with an emphasis on minimal and economically meaningful assumptions on the market primitives, the paper provides a general existence result for non-trivial equilibria (i.e. those with positive production), a uniqueness argument, and an extensive inquiry into the e¤ects of market structure (or exogenous entry) on market performance. In terms of novel questions, the paper o¤ers a general treatment of the critical issue of industry start-up, including the role of the number of …rms in the market; some insight into the notion that the presence of expectations can substantially broaden the scope of possible outcomes relative to standard Cournot oligopoly; and a new look at the notion of free entry equilibrium into network industries. Throughout, the paper takes a comparative perspective in that new …ndings are contrasted with their standard Cournot counterparts, in an attempt to shed light on the novel features of network industries.
The underlying approach is to impart minimal monotonicity structure to the oligopoly model at hand, which achieves the twin goals of ensuring the existence of a ful…lled expectations Cournot equilibrium while at the same time allowing clear-cut predictions on the comparative statics of market performance with respect to the number of …rms. The critical structure is imposed on the model in the form of two economically meaningful complementarity conditions on the primitives that guarantee the key properties that, along a given …rm's best response, industry output increases in rivals'total output as well as in the expected network size. The overall analysis relies on latticetheoretic methods. 3 This approach allows us to unify in a common setting the existing results in the literature on network goods, considerably weakening the required conditions, as well as to derive important new results. A key bene…t of the approach is to allow for more transparent economic intuition behind the cause-e¤ect relationships we analyze.
We next provide a more detailed overview of our …ndings, coupled with a literature review. The problem of existence of ful…lled expectations Cournot equilibrium proceeds in two distinct steps.
To establish abstract existence via Tarski's …xed point theorem, we adopt the arguments of Amir and Lambson (2000) and Kwon (2007) that directly exploit the monotonicity structure discussed above. However, as expectations about the size of the network is a key determinant of consumers' willingness to pay in these industries, the trivial, no production, equilibrium is often part of the equilibrium set. When this is the case, our previous proof of existence is not of much interest; it uses powerful methods to establish existence, but the underlying equilibrium may a priori be the trivial one, the presence of which can be characterized in more direct fashion. As a consequence we complete the analysis by o¤ering a second set of (stronger) conditions that ensure the existence of (at least) one non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive sales.
Although our model is static in nature, we construct an explicit dynamics mapping consumers' 3 See Topkis (1978) , Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) .
perspectives. We explore in some detail the consequences on the concept of free entry. We show that free entry is quite indeterminate in industries with network externalities, and propose the concept of strong free entry equilibrium as a re…nement that leads to the free entry equilibrium with the largest number of …rms as unique outcome. However, this re…nement requires some preplay communication amongst …rms without the possibility of making binding agreements. Such coordination, though pro-competitive in that it increases competition, may well engender antitrust action. In addition, since the incumbent …rms in the market may prefer to see further entry by new …rms, a number of policy issues may need a fresh look and some revisiting. There may be more scope for pro-competitive cooperation or coordination by …rms. One might observe a higher propensity for licensing, possibly coupled with lower royalty rates; less patenting or a permissive attitude towards patent infringement; as well as more product standardization in industries where each …rm might possess its own separate network of consumers. These likely policy consequences are similar to those one might expect to see as a consequence of the result that having more …rms alleviates the start-up problem for the industry. In short, when more competition can be necessary to get the industry started up, or to enhance each …rm's pro…t in an ongoing industry, the usual trade-o¤s between consumer surplus and producer surplus are no longer the norm, and it is not surprising that many pillars of conventional wisdom about market behavior and appropriate antitrust policy might need revisiting. In particular, new avenues for cooperation amongst …rms that compete in the product market might open up in network industries. Proper reaction to these new incentives for coordinated action by market competitors might well require a substantial overhaul of existing antitrust policy (Shapiro, 1996) . This in turn ought to rely on extensive theoretical analysis focusing on the special nature of industries with network externalities, and this is a primary motivation of the present work.
The e¤ects of entry on industry performance as re ‡ected in social welfare, consumer surplus and industry pro…ts also display some distinctive features as compared to standard Cournot competition.
The demand-side economies of scale weaken the conditions under which social welfare and industry pro…ts increase with more entry. Alternatively, if the cross-e¤ect on the inverse demand function is positive, it is possible that consumer surplus decreases with n: Katz and Shapiro (1985) explain, in a similar (although not identical) situation, the intuition behind this result: If the network externality is strong for the marginal consumer, then the increase in the expected network caused by the change in the number of …rms will raise his or her willingness to pay for the good by more than that of the average consumer. As a consequence, the …rms will be able to raise price by more than the increase in the average consumer's willingness to pay for the product and consumer surplus will fall.
Another noteworthy aspect of this paper is that we provide several explicit examples with easy closed-form solutions to illustrate in a simple way some of the conclusions we derive. In particular, Example 1 captures most of the relevant features often associated with the telecommunication industry in the literature. 6 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, introduces the equilibrium concept and the main assumptions. Section 3 proves existence of trivial and non-trivial equilibria, and provides conditions for the equilibrium to be unique. Section 4 discusses the scope for network e¤ects to broaden the set of possible outcomes. Section 5 studies industry viability. Section 6 analyzes output, price and per-…rm pro…ts as a function of the number of …rms in the market. Section 7 deals with free entry equilibrium in markets with network e¤ects. Section 8 looks at market performance as re ‡ected in social welfare, consumer surplus and aggregate pro…ts, again, as a function of n. Section 9 contains all the proofs of this paper. Finally, an elementary and self-contained review of the lattice-theoretic notions and results needed here forms the Appendix.
The analytical framework
This section presents the standard oligopoly model with network e¤ects along with the commonly used equilibrium concept due to Katz and Shapiro (1985) . In view of the more general nature of our treatment, we enumerate all the needed assumptions we shall use later and their justi…cation.
We consider a static model to analyze oligopolistic competition in industries with positive network e¤ects, re ‡ected in consumers' willingness to pay being increasing in the number of other agents acquiring the same good. We assume the …rms' products are homogeneous and perfectly compatible with each other, so there is a single network comprising the outputs of all …rms in the industry.
The market is fully described by the inverse demand function P (Z; S) and the number of identical …rms n, each having cost function C (x), where x denotes the …rm's output, Z aggregate output in the market and S the expected size of the network. The cost of producing no output is zero: Considering that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good, S also stands for the expected number of people buying the good. Sometimes, it will be useful to express the production 6 Some of the examples we construct below do not satisfy all the assumptions in this paper. As the violations are not critical in any way and analytical examples (with nice closed-form solutions that capture the features we want to highlight) are hard to come by, we are not concerned by this issue. side in terms of average cost A (x) ; de…ned as C (x) =x with A (0) = C 0 (0):
For a given S; each …rm's reaction correspondence is obtained by maximizing the pro…t function (x; y; S) = xP (x + y; S) C (x) e x (y; S) = arg max f (x; y; S) : 0 x Kg
where x is the …rm's level of output, y the output of the other (n 1) …rms in the market and K > 0 the production capacity of each …rm.
At equilibrium, all relevant quantities x; y; Z and will be indexed by the underlying number of …rms n, e.g., we shall denote Z n the equilibrium industry output corresponding to n …rms in the market, and x in the equilibrium output of …rm i. When clear from the context, we will avoid the subindex i in the latter variable.
Each …rm chooses its output level to maximize its pro…ts under the assumptions that (i) consumers'expectations about the size of the network, S; is given; and (ii) the output level of the other …rms, y, is …xed. Alternatively, we may think of the …rm as choosing total output Z = x + y, given the other …rm's cumulative output, y; and the expected size of the network, S, in which case, with e (Z; y; S) = (Z y) P (Z; S) C (Z y) e Z (y; S) = arg max fe (Z; y; S) : y Z y + Kg :
Consistency requires e Z (y; S) = e x (y; S) + y:
An equilibrium in this game is a vector (x 1n ; x 2n ; :::; x nn ) that satis…es the following conditions
Since the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985) , this notion of equilibrium, known as "Ful…lled Expectations Cournot Equilibrium (FECE)", has become standard for oligopolies with network e¤ects. It requires that both consumers and …rms correctly predict the market outcome, so that their beliefs are con…rmed in equilibrium, i.e., expectations are rational. While strategic in their choice of outputs in the usual Cournot sense, …rms are "network-size taking" in their perceived inability to directly in ‡uence customers'expectations of market size. One plausible justi…cation for this is that …rms are unable to credibly commit to output levels that customers could observe and reliably use in formulating expectations about network size (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . 7 7 Were such commitment credible for …rms, standard Cournot equilibrium with inverse demand function P (Z; Z)
Viewing S as an inverse demand shift variable, condition 1 just describes the equilibrium in standard Cournot competition with exogenous S. Let z n (S) denote the corresponding industry output equilibrium correspondence. Adding condition 2, an aggregate output Z n 2 z n (S) constitutes a FECE industry output if it satis…es Z n = S as well. As a consequence, if we graph z n (S)
as a function of S, the FECE industry outputs are all the points where this correspondence crosses the 45 line. This idea will play a key role in both the proof of existence and the viability analysis.
Another, fully game-theoretic, interpretation of this equilibrium notion is in the context of a two-stage game, wherein a market maker (or a regulator) announces an expected network size S in the …rst stage, and …rms compete in Cournot fashion facing inverse demand P (Z; S) in the second stage. If the market maker's objective function is to minimize jS z n (S)j, then to any subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game corresponds a FECE of the Cournot market with network externalities, and vice-versa.
Whenever well-de…ned, we denote the maximal and minimal points of a set by an upper and a lower bar, respectively. Thus, for instance, Z n and Z n are the highest and lowest industry equilibrium outputs when there are n …rms in the market.
Denote by W (Z; S) , R Z 0 P (t; S) dt ZA (Z=n) the Marshallian social welfare when aggregate output is Z; all …rms produce the same quantity and the expected size of the network is S. Similarly, consumer surplus is CS (Z; S) , R Z 0 P (t; S) dt ZP (Z; S). We now list the assumptions used in this paper, starting with a set of standard ones, followed by more substantive assumptions.
The standard assumptions are (A1) P (:; :) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, P 1 (Z; S) < 0 and P 2 (Z; S) > 0.
(A2) C (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and increasing.
(A3) x i K; for all …rm i.
These are all commonly used assumptions, including P 2 (Z; S) > 0, which re ‡ects positive network e¤ects, or the property that consumers'willingness to pay increases in the expected number of people who will buy the good. Assumption A3 imposes capacity constraints in the production process of each …rm, a convenient assumption to force compact output sets in a setting where …rms would be the more appropriate concept. A direct comparison between these two concepts also appears in Katz and Shapiro (1985) . may otherwise wish to produce unbounded output levels. Our results do not rely in any way on K taking on any particular sets of values, as in Amir and Lambson (2000) .
The second set of assumptions are placed on two functions that play a key role in the overall analysis. Let 1 (Z; y) denote the cross-partial derivative of e (Z; y; S) with respect to Z and y, and 2 (Z; S) the cross-partial derivative of log P (Z; S) with respect to Z and S, scaled by [P (Z; S)] 2 ;
1 (Z; y) = P 1 (Z; S) + C 00 (Z y) and
The domains of 1 and 2 are ' 1 f(Z; y) : y 0; Z yg and ' 2 f(Z; S) : Z y; S 0g respectively, both of which are lattices (in the product order).
The second set of assumptions is
Assumptions A4 and A5 guarantee that the pro…t function e (Z; y; S) has strictly increasing di¤erences on ' 1 and the strict single-crossing property in (Z; S) ; respectively. A4 allows for limited scale economies in production, and has been justi…ed in detail by Amir and Lambson (2000) . A5 has the precise economic interpretation that the elasticity of demand increases in the expected network size S: 8 In his pioneering study of the elementary microeconomic foundations of interdependent demands, Leibenstein (1950) suggested that demand is more elastic in network markets because individual reactions to price changes are followed by additional reactions, in the same direction, to each other's change in consumption. 9 A5 essentially captures the cumulative e¤ect of these mutually reinforcing e¤ects on aggregate demand. Another plausible interpretation of A5 is that it formalizes the concept of demand-side scale economies that is often postulated as a characteristic of network e¤ects in the literature, though not in a precise manner. In terms of the model structure, the direct e¤ects of A4 and A5 in the upcoming analysis are that e Z (y; S) increases in y and S, respectively. 8 The price elasticity of demand is
; which is increasing in S if and only if log P (Z; S) has increasing di¤erences in (Z; S) (Topkis, 1998, p. 66). 9 Although Leibenstein referred to the concept of positively interdependent demands as "bandwagon e¤ect", it is essentially identical to the network e¤ect we analyze in this paper.
A6 holds that P (Z; S) is log-concave in Z. This is a generalized concavity condition that guarantees that e Z (y; S) is a single-valued function. As most results in this paper do not require the latter property, A6 is crucially needed only for the uniqueness result, Theorem 7.
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
In this section we provide a general abstract equilibrium existence result, exploiting the minimal monotonic structure of the model re ‡ected in A4-A5. Then we derive additional su¢ cient conditions that guarantee the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive industry output. We …nally provide conditions for the equilibrium to be unique.
Existence of FECE
We begin with the central monotonicity result, which is a direct consequence of A4 and A5.
Lemma 1 Assume A1-A5 are satis…ed. Then, every selection of the best-response correspondence e Z (y; S) is increasing in both y and S.
This lemma leads to an abstract existence result for symmetric equilibrium, along with the fact that the same assumptions preclude the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 Assume A1-A5 are satis…ed. Then, for each n 2 N; the Cournot oligopoly with network e¤ ects has (at least) one symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibria. Lemma 3 Assume A1-A4 are satis…ed. Then, for any given n 2 N , (i) the standard Cournot oligopoly (with exogenous S) has a symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibria;
(ii) if in addition A5 holds, the maximal and minimal selections of z n (S), z n (S) and z n (S), increase in S; and (iii) if in addition A5-A6 hold, z n (:) is a single-valued and continuous function.
In network markets, the trivial (zero-production) outcome, (Z; S) = (0; 0), is often an equilibrium. This phenomenon intensi…es when the network good has little stand-alone value (i.e., P (Z; 0) is small). The telecommunication industries, such as faxes, phones and e-mails, typically exhibit this characteristic. Given any of these goods, if end users believe no one else will acquire it, the good will have no value, and the trivial outcome will necessarily be part of the equilibrium set.
In such markets, Theorem 2 is not of much interest since the underlying equilibrium may a priori be the trivial one, the presence of which can be characterized in more direct fashion. To complete the picture, we …rst provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the trivial equilibrium, and then add some extra assumptions to ensure the existence of (at least) one non-trivial equilibrium.
Lemma 4 For any n 2 N , the trivial outcome is an equilibrium if and only if
Thus if the trivial outcome is an equilibrium for some n, it remains an equilibrium for all n 2 N .
This lemma simply says that the trivial equilibrium arises if and only if when the common expectation (amongst …rms and consumers) about the size of the network is zero, and a …rm believes the other …rms will produce no output, the best it can do under (3) is to produce zero as well. The proof follows directly from the de…nition of FECE. It also states that if the trivial equilibrium prevails for a given n, the industry will admit the trivial equilibrium for any other number of …rms.
Building on Theorem 2, the next result provides alternative su¢ cient conditions to ensure the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive industry output.
Theorem 5 Assume A1-A5 are satis…ed. There exists a non-trivial equilibrium if at least one of the following conditions is also ful…lled (i) zero is not an equilibrium output (i.e. (3) does not hold);
(ii) zero is an equilibrium output, P (0; 0) = C 0 (0), P 1 (0; 0) + P 2 (0; 0) > 0 and
zero is an equilibrium output, C 00 (:) 0 and for some S 2 (0; nK], some b Z S and all
In Theorem 5 (i), a non-trivial equilibrium exists as a consequence of Theorem 2, as it guarantees the existence of at least one equilibrium. Then, if the trivial one is not part of the equilibrium set, there must be an equilibrium with a strict positive industry output. This result captures the case most often investigated in the literature, dealing with a high stand-alone value for the network good. 10 Under the conditions in Part (ii), although z n (0) = 0, z n (S) starts above the 45 line near 0,
implying the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium in view of Theorem 2. Formally, this follows from applying Tarski's Theorem to z n (S) for S 2 [ ; nK], given some > 0 small enough. As expected, the stronger the network e¤ect around the origin is, as captured by P 2 (0; 0) ; the less stringent the existence condition for the non-trivial equilibrium gets (i.e. the lower the threshold value of n is).
Condition (4) ensures that, although z n (0) = 0, z n (S) is above the 45 line at some S 2 (0; nK], so a non-trivial equilibrium exists by Tarski's Theorem applied to z n (:) mapping [S; nK] to itself.
An interpretation of (4), involving the evaluation of a weighted combination of welfare and pro…ts (see Bergstrom and Varian, 1985) , is given in the Appendix (see Lemma 25) .
The proof of Theorem 5 uses the following intermediate result, which also plays a key role in the viability analysis (Section 4).
If in addition P (0; 0) = C 0 (0), the slope of z n (:) is also single-valued and right-continuous at 0, and
If the trivial equilibrium is not interior, i.e. P (0; 0)
This lemma shows the trivial equilibrium has interesting properties. Although z n (:) might a priori be multi-valued, i.e. a correspondence, when zero is part of the equilibrium set, it is singlevalued at the origin. If in addition the trivial equilibrium is interior, the slope of this function is given by (5) and depends on n.
Uniqueness of FECE
Theorems 2 and 5 prove existence, but they do not eliminate the possibility of multiple equilibria, which, in markets with network e¤ects, constitutes more of a norm than an exception. Multiple equilibria are due to the positive feedback typical of network industries that derives from expectations. If consumers believe the good will not succeed, it will usually fail. On the contrary, if they expect it to succeed, it will usually succeed.
In this subsection, we assume A6 is satis…ed, in addition to A1-A5. The added bene…t of A6 is to ensure that z n (:) is single-valued and continuous, as shown in Lemma 3 (iii). Although A6 is su¢ cient for uniqueness in standard Cournot competition (see Amir and Lambson, 2000) , the same result here requires an additional condition related to the function
The function f (Z; n) describes the slope of z n (S) with respect to S along the diagonal path, i.e., at S = Z (see Proofs): The next theorem shows uniqueness of FECE.
Theorem 7
In addition to A1-A6, assume f (Z; n) < 1 for all Z in [0; nK] : Then, the Cournot game with network e¤ ects has a unique and symmetric FECE, which coincides with the trivial equilibrium if and only if (3) holds.
The proof of this theorem is simple. Assuming A1-A6 are satis…ed, z n (:) is single-valued and continuous. If in addition f (Z; n) is everywhere lower than one, then the slope of z n (:) along the diagonal is lower than one as well. The uniqueness result now follows directly from this observation, since any two adjacent …xed points of z n (:) must include one for which f (Z; n) is larger than one.
The assumption in Theorem 7 is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition to ensure uniqueness, in the tradition of methods based on degree theory (Dierker, 1972) . Although it is not globally satis…ed in the less general model of Katz and Shapiro (1985) , their equilibrium is unique anyway.
On the theoretical scope of network e¤ects
In view of the need for an expectations-based equilibrium concept instead of one of the standard concepts of oligopolistic behavior centered on Nash equilibrium, it is natural to investigate the extent to which the presence of these expectations enlarges the scope of possible outcomes in network industries. One meaningful way to frame such a question is to characterize the class of functions that could emerge as possible equilibrium industry outputs given network size S, i.e., as possible selections of the Cournot equilibrium correspondence z n (S). 11 Some simple insights into this question can be derived by considering, with a given number of …rms n, zero production costs and the speci…c inverse demand (see Amir and Lambson, 2000) , with h 0 0;
For regular Cournot oligopoly (with demand function (7) and exogenous S), there is a unique
Cournot equilibrium and it is in dominant strategies:
Hence …rms have constant reactions curves, and may thus be viewed as essentially non-strategic and fully predictable in their behavior.
The FECE solve the …xed-point relation Z = h(S) = S. Since f is so far an arbitrary function, h(S) = S may have no solutions at all (if h does not intersect the 45 line), or as many solutions (or FECE points) as h has …xed points. In particular, if h is taken to be the identity function, anything at all is a FECE, and the model has no predictive power whatsoever! This argument shows rather strikingly the scope of possible new outcomes that expectations or network e¤ects can generate, which have no counterparts in the corresponding regular Cournot oligopoly. Indeed, this illustration has an "anything goes" ‡avor of a rather extreme kind. This construction also illustrates the potential for multiple equilibria in the presence of network e¤ects, along with new issues to face for testing such models (Echenique and Komunjer, 2009 (Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986 ). The answers provided in these two di¤erent settings were similarly broad, in that any function with minimal regularity conditions is a valid outcome function.
Hence, the conclusions were that the two underlying theories impose very little structure on their respective outcome functions. 
Industry viability
Many studies suggest that the left panel of Figure 1 re ‡ects the structure of the telecommunication industries. The underlying game there displays three possible equilibria, the trivial equilibrium, a middle unstable equilibrium, usually called critical mass, and a high stable equilibrium. 12 The justi…cation of this con…guration is quite simple: If all the consumers expect that no one will acquire the good, then the good has no value and no one will end up buying it, resulting in the trivial equilibrium for the industry. However, if expectations are higher to start with, another, non-trivial, equilibria will prevail.
Whenever the trivial equilibrium is locally stable in expectations (as in Figure 1 ), one possibility is that the market never emerges as a result of an expected size of the network that is too low to start with. In view of the equilibrium concept adopted here, the incumbent …rms are simply unable to in ‡uence these expectations to get them past the critical mass. Under such conditions, even if the industry does get going, Cournot equilibrium on the basis of low expectations cannot lead …rms to produce enough output to generate expectations beyond the critical mass, and the industry will unravel through a natural process towards the trivial equilibrium. This argument is commonly invoked to capture the start-up problem that frequently a¤ects these markets, and is often referred to as the "chicken and egg" paradox. Oren and Smith (1981) o¤er an early discussion of this phenomenon in electronic communication markets.
The tacit dynamic process underlying this analysis can be formalized through the following expectations/network size recursion, starting from any initial S 0 0, where b z n will denote either the maximal or minimal selection, but sometimes any increasing selection, of z n , as will be speci…ed,
This process thus begins with a historically given initial expectation S 0 , then postulates that …rms react by engaging in Cournot competition with demand P (Z; S 0 ), leading to an industry output b z n (S 0 ). The latter will in turn determine consumers expectation S 1 2 b z n (S 0 ), and the process repeats inde…nitely. This yields a sequential adjustment process in which consumers and …rms behave myopically with respect to the size of the network. Taking a single-valued selection of z n (S) amounts to selecting one particular Cournot equilibrium for each given S.
For each increasing selection of z n (S), denoted b z n (S), we can formally de…ne the corresponding critical mass as the smallest initial expectation b S 0 such that for all S 0 > b S 0 , the orbit given by (8) converges to a nonzero FECE. This de…nition captures the notion of critical mass irrespective of whether the selection at hand is continuous, or continuous from one side only (i.e. right or left), or neither, at the critical mass (see below). In the right panel of Figure 1 , there is a whole interval of critical masses, each corresponding to a di¤erent monotonic selection of z n (S).
As we shall consider explicitly the dynamics in (8) as given by the two extremal selections, as re ‡ected in the right side of Figure 1 , the usual notions of stability need to be adapted accordingly. 13 De…nition 8 The trivial equilibrium is best-case (worst-case) stable if there is a right neighborhood
Here, the quali…cation of best-case and worst-case refers to the type of Cournot equilibrium selection given network size S. Indeed, as is intuitive, the maximal (minimal) selection is most (least) favorable for the viability of the industry. Note that in the right panel of Figure 1 , CM 2 and CM 3 are the best-case and worst-case critical masses, respectively.
Let V b n (V w n ) denote the largest set of values of S 0 for which the trivial equilibrium is best-case (worst-case) stable. We shall refer to V b n and V w n as the best and worst-case basins of attraction of the trivial equilibrium, respectively.
In view of Lemma 6, both z n and z n are continuously di¤erentiable at 0 with z 0 n (0) = z 0 n (0). Assuming henceforth that this derivative is (generically) not equal to 1, 0 is an isolated equilibrium (for a formal proof, see e.g., Granas and Dugundji, 2003, p. 326-327) . Since in addition, z n and z n are increasing in S, both V b n and V w n are intervals. 14 In the left panel of Figure 1 , as z n (:) is single-valued, these two intervals coincide and are equal to (0; CM 1 ); in the right panel of this …gure z n and z n induce V b n = (0; CM 2 ) and V w n = (0; CM 3 ], respectively. 15 Each industry can be classi…ed into one of three possible categories in terms of best-case or worst-case viability.
De…nition 9 An industry is said to be (i) best-case (worst-case) uniformly viable if every orbit in (8) with b z n = z n (z n ) converges to some non-zero equilibrium starting from any S 0 > 0;
(ii) best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable if, for z n (z n ); the same convergence as in (i) takes place only from su¢ ciently high S 0 ; and (iii) best-case (worst-case) nonviable if every orbit in (8) with b z n = z n (z n ) converges to 0 from any
This de…nition extends in the obvious way to any increasing selection of z n (S), in which case one simply removes the quali…ers "best-case" and "worst-case".
Thus, for any increasing selection b z n (S), the critical mass is 0 if the industry is uniformly viable, 1 if it is nonviable, and satis…es if the industry is conditionally viable: 16 b S 0 > 0 and
The next result provides su¢ cient conditions for each viability outcome by linking it to our previous results on the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium. To provide a basis for comparing two di¤erent situations that might prevail for the same industry, we need to formalize a partial order for increasing viability.
De…nition 11
The best-case (worse-case) viability of an industry is said to increase if either (i) the industry goes from best-case (worst-case) nonviable to best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable, or from the latter to best-case (worst-case) uniformly viable; or (ii) the industry is best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable and V b n (V w n ) contracts.
The next result shows that additional …rms in the market can only enhance the viability of the network industry. 17 Examples 1 and 2, at the end of this section, illustrate this key e¤ect.
Theorem 12 Assume A1-A5 are satis…ed. Then, (i) both z n (:) and z n (:) shift up as n increases. Hence, having more …rms in an industry always increases its best-case and worst-case viability; and
(ii) if the trivial outcome is an equilibrium (i.e. (3) holds) and P 1 (0; 0) + P 2 (0; 0) 0, an industry cannot be uniformly viable for any n (even in best-case).
Theorem 12 captures the key role of market structure on industry viability: Having more …rms around implies that a lower critical mass would be needed to launch a given industry. The underlying intuition is intimately connected to the FECE concept, as discussed next. Consider the natural question: In case S 0 happens to be below critical mass, why can't the existing …rms attempt to act as if there were more of them by producing a higher output level in an e¤ort to in ‡uence consumers'
expectations of the network size upwards? In a context where the appropriate solution concept is FECE, …rms presumably cannot commit to their desired output levels in a credible way, and, likewise, attempting to in ‡ate their number by committing to a higher output would also not be credible, and would thus not constitute behavior compatible with the FECE concept.
This result is consistent with observed market behavior. The fax market took decades beyond the discovery of the technology to get started (Shapiro and Varian, 1998 ). Now and then, an attempt at launching a new product with network e¤ects is seen to fail. One plausible diagnosis according to the present analysis is an insu¢ cient number of …rms at the early stages of the emerging industry.
In industries with multiple …rms having their own versions of the same general good, this result might explain why …rms often settle for full compatibility between their products, instead of incompatibility. Their objective is to generate a single industry network that would be viable, when separate networks with one …rm each would not be. This implies that some form of cooperation amongst direct rivals could be needed for their products to succeed. One example is the case of Sony and Philips, who jointly created industry standards for compact disc in the mid 80's (Shapiro, 1996) . Such forms of cooperation have no counterparts in non-network industries.
Example 1. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs, and inverse demand function given by
The reaction function of a …rm is e x (y; S) = (1=2) exp(1 1=S): Since each …rm has a dominant strategy, e x (y; S) does not depend on y, and we can add the reaction functions to obtain
An equilibrium industry output solves z n (Z) = Z in Z. Then we have: Z 1 = f0g, Z 2 = f0; 1g, Z 3 = f0; 0:457; 2:882g and Z 4 = f0; 0:373; 4:311g, as shown in Figure 2 .
As can be easily seen, the trivial equilibrium is always stable. With only one …rm in the market, this is the only equilibrium so the industry is nonviable. With one extra …rm, a larger equilibrium appears and the industry becomes conditionally viable (barely so as z n (:) is tangent to the 45 line).
For a larger number of …rms, the equilibrium con…guration encompasses three equilibria; the two extreme are stable and the intermediate one is unstable. This last equilibrium, often called critical mass, decreases in n. This is an exact closed-form example of the three-equilibrium constellation that is often portrayed as typical in many network industries.
Here, z n (:) shifts up as n increases (cf. Theorem 12). The industry goes from nonviable to conditionally viable as n goes from 1 to 2 …rms. As n further increases, viability increases since the basin of attraction of 0 shrinks, but uniform viability is never attained since P 1 (0; 0) + P 2 (0; 0) = 0 (cf. Theorem 12).
In our …rst example, initial expectations must be high enough to start the market up (when n 2). Although the critical mass shrinks as the number of …rms increases, the start-up problem As equilibrium industry output solves z n (Z) = Z, we have three possible equilibrium con…gurations We observe in the graph that when n = 1 the slope of z n (S) with respect to S is everywhere less than one, and the industry is nonviable. When n = 2 the industry becomes uniformly viable (barely so, as z n (:) coincides with the 45 line). Finally, for all n > 2 every orbit in (8) converges to nK starting from any S 0 > 0, so the industry is uniformly viable as well.
The previous examples illustrate two di¤erent situations where the presence of network e¤ects might have unusual implications on …rms'attitudes towards intellectual property rights and entry deterrence. Indeed, …rms will not be tempted to engage in entry deterrence activities if their number is insu¢ cient to start-up an industry. In such a case, those in possession of patents will have a much higher incentive than usual to engage in licensing, and will even …nd it in their interest to give away their patents to their competitors. Naturally, such generosity will prevail only until the industry is started up, or until pro…ts cease to increase with the number of competitors, as we shall see below.
Equilibrium price, outputs and pro…ts
This section studies the e¤ects of market structure on the equilibrium industry output, per-…rm The next analysis makes all the statements on the largest equilibrium, i.e. the one with the largest equilibrium outputs, namely, Z n and x n . When the trivial outcome is an equilibrium, it is also the smallest equilibrium. Since it is invariant in the number of …rms, the comparative statics questions below are of no interest for that equilibrium. When the trivial outcome is not an equilibrium, then our conclusions also apply to the minimal selections, Z n and x n .
Our …rst theorem relates new entry to equilibrium industry output and market price.
Theorem 13 Assume conditions A1-A5 are satis…ed. Then, we have (i) the extremal equilibrium industry outputs, Z n and Z n , increase in n; and
Theorem 13 (i) is also true in standard Cournot competition, as shown by Amir and Lambson (2000), Theorem 2.2 (b). In the latter, the usual law of demand su¢ ces for the market price to decrease after new entry. As Part (ii) indicates, the e¤ect of entry on market price is ambiguous when network e¤ects prevail. The reason is that when industry output increases the …rms must set the price low enough to attract the marginal consumer, but when more buyers joint the network consumers'willingness to pay increases. Thus the overall e¤ect of entry on the market price depends on how relevant the output e¤ect is as compared to the network e¤ect. As a consequence, the socalled property of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar assumptions holds in the standard Cournot game, is not satis…ed here.
To make inferences about the e¤ects of entry on equilibrium per-…rm outputs and pro…ts, we need to introduce a new function
Theorem 14 In addition to A1-A5, assume Z n and Z n+1 are interior equilibria and let I n = [Z n ; Z n+1 ]. Then, we have (i) if g (Z) 0 on I n , the largest per-…rm equilibrium output increases in n, i.e. x n+1 x n ; and (ii) if g (Z) 0 on I n , the largest per-…rm equilibrium output decreases in n, i.e. x n+1 x n :
In short, this result holds that the scope for the business-stealing e¤ect, which is nearly universal in standard Cournot oligopoly (at least in a global sense), is quite a bit narrower in the presence of network externalities. On the other hand, the scope for the opposite, or business-enhancing, e¤ect is much broader in the present setting, as we see next.
Corollary 15 In addition to the conditions of Theorem 14, assume no costs of production. Then
on I n , for which log-convexity of P (Z; S) in Z is a su¢ cient condition.
The left-hand side of (10) is the same as g (Z) when the …rms face no production costs. Its …rst term is positive by A5, and log-convexity of P (Z; S) in Z ensures the second one is positive as well. Therefore log-convexity is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for the highest per-…rm equilibrium output to increase after new entry. Amir and Lambson (2000), Theorem 2.3, require log-convexity to globally ensure the same result for standard Cournot competition. Hence network e¤ects facilitate this unusual outcome.
Based on Theorems 13 and 14, the following result deals with the e¤ects of entry on per-…rm equilibrium pro…ts. Recall that in standard Cournot oligopoly, the only part of the conventional wisdom about the e¤ects of competition that is universally valid is that per-…rm pro…ts decline with the number of competitors (Amir and Lambson, 2000, and Amir, 2003) . We now see that in the presence of network e¤ects, this result can easily be reversed.
Theorem 16
In addition to A1-A5, assume Z n and Z n+1 are interior equilibria and let I n = [Z n ; Z n+1 ]. Then, we have (i) if P 1 (Z; Z) + P 2 (Z; Z) 0 and g (Z) 0 on I n , at the largest equilibrium, n+1 n ; and
(ii) if P 1 (Z; Z) + P 2 (Z; Z) 0 and g (Z) 0 on I n , at the largest equilibrium, n+1 n :
The …rst result provides su¢ cient conditions for the …rms in the market to prefer further entry by new …rms. It generalizes a result in Economides (1996) , based on a more speci…c formulation, which in turn formalizes a remark made by Katz and Shapiro (1985) .
Although surprising, the intuition for this outcome is simple. New entry increases the equilibrium industry output, as shown in Theorem 13, and a direct e¤ect is that market price goes down by the usual law of demand. But via the e¤ect on the size of the network, this output increase also shifts the inverse demand function up, thus pushing for a price increase. Then if the overall e¤ect on the market price is positive and each …rm increases own output, the existing …rms in the market are better-o¤ after new entry. As Economides (1996) states, if the externalities are strong, the network e¤ect dominates the usual competitive e¤ect of entry.
A natural question arises when pro…ts increase in n. Why can't the existing …rms attempt to act as if there were more of them in order to each reap higher pro…ts at equilibrium? Since they would do so by producing a higher output level in an e¤ort to in ‡uence consumers' expectations of the network size upward, the answer is the same as for the start-up problem: The tacit lack of commitment power on the part of the …rms, which is at the heart of the FECE concept.
Corollary 17
In addition to the conditions of Theorems 14 and 16, assume P 11 (Z; Z)+P 12 (Z; Z) = 0, for all Z. If P 1 (Z; Z) + P 2 (Z; Z) ( ) 0 on I n , then, at the largest equilibrium, (i) per-…rm equilibrium output increases (decreases) in n, i.e. x n+1 ( ) x n ; and (ii) per-…rm equilibrium pro…ts increase (decrease) in n, i.e. n+1 ( ) n .
The new condition in Corollary 17, P 11 (Z; Z) + P 12 (Z; Z) = 0; is satis…ed if, for example, P (Z; S) = h (S) kZ with h(:) an increasing function, or P (Z; S) = f (S Z) with f (:) increasing on the reals.
We end this section with an example that highlights the implications of Theorem 16, and then explain how these results a¤ect the standard characterization of the free entry number of …rms. Assuming K is large enough, the reaction function of any given …rm is e x (y; S) = max f(a + bS y) =2; 0g :
After a simple computation, the symmetric equilibrium industry output is implicitly de…ned by
Let a = 10; b = 5 and = 4=5: Using a numerical approach, per-…rm equilibrium pro…ts for di¤erent values of n are We observe that when the number of …rms is small, n = 1; 2 or 3; the incumbent …rms will be better o¤ if an extra …rm enters the market. When n 4, …rms will be worse-o¤ after new entry:
Consider for instance a situation where entry costs are 14; 440, say. Then a single …rm would barely make a positive pro…t, and potential entrants might decide to stay out if they based their assessment on standard oligopoly settings (due to pro…t just covering entry costs). Yet, the market should actually accommodate a full 21 …rms at the unique free entry equilibrium!
The next section explores some other consequences of the presence of network e¤ects on the well-known concept of free entry equilibrium.
Free entry and FECE
Consider the standard problem of free entry as a two-stage game (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston, 1986 ). In the …rst stage, each of an in…nite number of …rms decides whether to enter the industry or not, knowing the entry cost EC. In the second stage, upon observing the number of entrants, …rms engage in standard Cournot competition. The free entry (subgame-perfect) equilibrium number of …rms n e is then de…ned by n e EC and n e +1 < EC:
These conditions simply state that the n e …rms that entered and those that did not do not regret their decisions. Assuming a unique Cournot equilibrium in the second stage, the free entry equilibrium number of …rms is uniquely de…ned (ignoring the integer constraint) by the zero-pro…t condition n e = EC since n is always decreasing in n.
In the present setting with network e¤ects, we can also de…ne free entry equilibrium as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, upon replacing the Cournot equilibrium in the second stage by a FECE selection, assumed to be a non-trivial one below. 18 We now investigate the consequences of keeping the standard de…nition of free entry equilibrium as given in (11) .
In light of Theorem 16, the concept of free entry equilibrium may not be as well-behaved for network industries. 19 The equilibrium number of …rms n e need not be uniquely de…ned as n may intersect the horizontal line at EC more than once, with the free entry equilibria being only those for which this intersection is from above to below. 20 1 8 As an abuse of terminology, we ignore here the fact that FECE is not a fully game-theoretic concept. 1 9 To begin with, FECE are often not unique, so to each FECE corresponds at least one free entry equilibrium. In particular, the presence of the trivial equilibrium would lead to no entry always being a free entry equilibrium. 2 0 In Example 3, it is of interest to observe that, although n is inverse U-shaped in n; the free entry number of Figure 4 : Free-entry and Network E¤ects
To …x ideas, let us focus on the situation depicted in Figure 4 . There are two free entry equilibria, n 1 and n 3 according to the de…nition given above. We assume in what follows that n 3 > EC and n 3 +1 < EC, which holds generically (thus, in contrast to much of the literature, we are not ignoring the integer constraint, and this will turn out to be crucial below). Clearly, with n 1 …rms in the market, no single …rm outside the market would wish to deviate and enter on its own. However, a group of n 3 n 1 …rms outside the market could stage a coalitional deviation -all enter the market -that would be bene…cial to all coalition members. With n 3 …rms in the market, no coalition has a pro…table deviation (we are assuming that, consistent with Figure 4 , n < EC for all n > n 3 ). 21 Hence, there is a unique strong Nash equilibrium, which is also coalition-proof, in the one-shot game with payo¤s written as functions of the two possible …rst-stage actions (enter and do not enter) for each …rm, given a non-trivial FECE in the second stage. This induces what we might refer to as a unique strong (and coalition-proof) free entry equilibrium with n 3 …rms in. The latter is also the Pareto-dominant free entry equilibrium if n 3 n 1 , but not otherwise. 22 Clearly, the underlying ideas behind this discussion are quite general. In cases where there are multiple free entry equilibria, only one is also coalition-proof and it is always the free entry equilibrium with the highest number of …rms in the market. This equilibrium clearly has a lot of …rms is nevertheless uniquely de…ned for any level of EC. 2 1 Here again, we are using the assumption n 3 > EC, since without it, there would be a pro…table coalitonal deviation to the n1 equilibrium in case n1 > n 3 . 2 2 A general remark about the common simplifying assumption of ignoring the integer constraint in the standard oligopoly literature is in order. If n e = EC holds, then each …rm is indi¤erent between entering and not entering.
So if one of the n e …rms went out of the market, we would still have a free entry equilibrium, which actually Paretodominates the original n e -…rm equilibrium since n e 1 > n e . Thus ignoring the integer constraint is not as innocuous as it seems. One way out is to assume the (rather arbitrary) tie-breaking rule that, when indi¤erent, a …rm always chooses to enter.
intuitive appeal from an applied perspective, since the free entry number of …rms is often thought of as the largest number of …rms that a market can sustain. It is thus reasonable to suggest coalition-proofness as a re…nement to the notion of free entry equilibrium in markets with network e¤ects. 23 On the other hand, for this equilibrium to obtain, some pre-play communication without the option of making binding agreements might well be needed, as is the case with coalition-based equilibrium notions in general. Such coordination of entry decisions by …rms might well violate existing antitrust legislation in practice.
In conclusion, the presence of network e¤ects creates quite some novel features as far as the central problem of free entry is concerned, and some of these might call for some new antitrust legislation allowing for entry coordination (i.e. pre-play communication) between competitors, and create some new scope for useful coordinating activities by other actors, such as business associations. These conclusions reinforce the earlier …ndings that the start-up phase of a network industry might call for new forms of inter-…rm cooperation.
Social welfare, consumer surplus and industry pro…ts
This section studies the e¤ects of an exogenous change in the number of …rms on social welfare, consumer surplus and industry pro…ts. As in the previous section, we continue to focus on the highest equilibrium outputs, Z n and x n . Speci…cally, our aim is to give su¢ cient conditions that validate, for the highest equilibrium, the conventional wisdom that social welfare and consumer surplus increase with more competition, while industry pro…ts decrease. Amir (2003) answers similar questions for standard Cournot competition, thus facilitating the corresponding comparisons.
We begin providing su¢ cient conditions for social welfare to increase with entry. Our initial assumptions, A1-A5, are consistent with x n being increasing or decreasing in n, as re ‡ected in Theorem 14. The next theorem shows the implications of these two possibilities on social welfare are quite di¤erent.
Theorem 18
At the highest equilibrium, for any given n, W n+1 W n if in addition to A1-A5 either one of the following conditions holds
Note that since P 2 (Z; S) > 0, by A1, and Z n+1 Z n , by Theorem 13 (i), the left hand side of Condition (i) is always positive. So our theorem identi…es the next two su¢ cient conditions:
Welfare increases in the number of …rms in the presence of diseconomies of scale (A (:) is increasing) and decreasing per-…rm output, or whenever per-…rm output increases in n.
Network e¤ects play a key role in these two conditions. As it is readily veri…ed, they facilitate the …rst inequality by enlarging the left hand side of Condition (i). As seen earlier, network e¤ects ease the conditions under which per-…rm output increases in n, therefore facilitating Condition (ii).
The next result states that if marginal costs are constant, then social welfare, at the highest equilibrium, always increases with entry. Although this outcome follows as a direct implication of Theorem 18 (i), we include it as a separate result because it re ‡ects the case most commonly analyzed in the existing literature.
Corollary 19
In addition to A1-A5, assume the cost of production is linear, i.e. C (x) = cx with c 0. Then, at the highest equilibrium, social welfare always increases in the number of …rms.
We next study consumer surplus, for which our results di¤er markedly from their counterparts in the standard Cournot oligopoly.
Theorem 20
At the highest equilibrium, for any given n, CS n+1 CS n if, in addition to A1-A5, either (i) P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 P Z n ; Z n ; or (ii) P 12 (Z; S) 0.
As a consequence of the so-called property of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar conditions holds in the standard Cournot game, Condition (i) is satis…ed there. Example 4, at the end of the section, shows the opposite sometimes happens in network industries. Katz and Shapiro (1985) clearly explain why this surprising result might occur here: If the marginal consumer has a strong network externality, then the increment in the expected network size generated by the larger number of …rms in the market, will increase his willingness to pay for the product above that of the average consumer. As a consequence, the …rms will be able to raise the price by more than the increase in the average consumer's willingness to pay for the product and consumer's surplus will fall.
Our last theorem deals with industry pro…ts. Like the previous two, it provides su¢ cient conditions for aggregate pro…ts to increase after new entry.
Theorem 21
At the highest equilibrium, for any given n, (n + 1) n+1 n n if, in addition to A1-A5, either (i) P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 P Z n ; Z n A (x n+1 ) A (x n ); or (ii) the conditions of Theorem 16 (i) are satis…ed.
The proof of this result is quite simple. Relying on the fact that the highest selection of the equilibrium industry output increases in n, it simply says that, if the overall e¤ect on the market price is larger than the change of the average cost of production, then industry pro…ts increase. The second statement follows as a simple corollary of Theorem 16 (i).
Corollary 22
In addition to A1-A5, assume the cost of production is linear, i.e. C (x) = cx with c 0. Then, at the highest equilibrium, industry pro…ts increase in the number of …rms if market price increases after new entry.
The last result follows directly from Theorem 21 (i), as linear cost implies constant average cost.
Example 4 ends this section. It illustrates how, at the highest equilibrium industry output, consumer surplus and industry pro…ts might decrease and increase, respectively, after new entry. The reaction function of any given …rm is
Thus, we have three possible equilibria
From a simple computation, consumer surplus is zero at the smallest equilibrium and, assuming a 1= (nK) 2 ; it equals the following expression at the highest one
Since this expression is decreasing in n, consumer surplus decreases after new entry for the highest equilibrium. This result is possible because Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 20 are not satis…ed, i.e. the market price at the highest equilibrium increases in n and P 12 (Z; S) = 3=S 4 > 0 for all Z; S:
Note that the opposite is true for aggregate pro…ts. The following expression shows that they increase in n at the highest equilibrium
As Corollary 19 states, we next show that social welfare, at the highest equilibrium, increases in n
These results point out some of the relevant di¤erences between Cournot competition with and without network e¤ects in terms of industry performance.
Proofs
This section provides the proofs for all the results of the paper, and also contains the statements and proofs of some useful intermediate results not given in the body of the paper.
The proof of Lemma 1 calls for an intermediate result.
Lemma 23 Assume A1-A5 hold. Then e (Z; y; S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z; S) :
Proof of Lemma 23
To prove this result, …rst note that 2 (Z; S) > 0 if and only if @ 2 log P (Z; S) =@Z@S > 0: We show that this condition implies that e (Z; y; S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z; S), i.e.
that for any Z > Z 0 and S > S 0 ; e Z; y; S 0 e Z 0 ; y; S 0 =) e (Z; y; S) > e Z 0 ; y; S :
Since @ 2 log P (Z; S) =@Z@S > 0 we have log P (Z; S) log P (Z 0 ; S) > log P (Z; S 0 ) log P (Z 0 ; S 0 ),
The left hand side of (12) can be rewritten as
Combining (13) and (14), we get
Multiplying both sides of (15) by P (Z 0 ; S) =P (Z 0 ; S 0 ) we obtain
By A1, P (Z 0 ; S) =P (Z 0 ; S 0 ) > 1 and, by A2, C (Z y) C (Z 0 y) : Thus, (16) implies
which is just the right hand side of (12) . Hence, (12) holds.
Proof of Lemma 1
Since @ 2 e (Z; y; S) =@Z@y = 1 (Z; y) > 0, by A4, the maximand in (2) By Lemma 1 we know that every selection of e Z (y; S) increases in y and S: Hence, for any …xed n 2 N , every selection of B n increases in (y; S), so that by Tarski's …xed point theorem [Theorem A.3, Appendix] , it has a …xed point. As argued before, a …xed point of B n is a symmetric equilibrium. This proves the …rst statement of Theorem 2. We next show that no asymmetric equilibria exists.
To this end, it su¢ ces to show that the correspondence e Z (y; S) is strictly increasing (in the sense that all its selections are strictly increasing) in y, for each S. Thus, for all possible S, to each Z 0 2 e Z (y; S) corresponds (at most) one y such that Z 0 = x 0 + y with Z 0 being a best-response to y and S. In other words, for each equilibrium output Z 0 , each …rm must be producing the same
A4 implies that @e (Z; y; S) =@Z is strictly increasing in y, a property slightly stronger than strictly increasing di¤erences in (Z; y): By Topkis (1998), Theorem 2.8.5 on p. 79, this property
implies that e Z (y; S) is strictly increasing in y for each S, whenever e Z (y; S) is interior. 25 The second statement in Theorem 2 follows because, as argued in the previous paragraph, this condition guarantees no asymmetric equilibria exist.
The next proof, from Amir and Lambson (2000) , is included for completeness only.
Proof of Lemma 3
To show Part (i) consider the mapping
The proof of existence and the fact that no asymmetric equilibrium exists follow as a simply corollary of the proof of Theorem 2, thus we omit it.
We next show that if A5 is also satis…ed, the extremal selections of z n (S), z n (S) and z n (S), increase in S. We know, by Topkis's theorem, that the maximal and minimal selections of T n denoted, respectively, T n and T n ; exist. Furthermore, the largest value of z n (S), z n (S), constitutes the largest …xed point of T n . Under A5 we know, by Lemma 1, that every selection of e Z (y; S) increases in S. Then the largest …xed point of T n , z n (S) ; is also increasing in S [Theorem A.4, Appendix]. A similar argument, using the selection T n , establishes that z n (S) is increasing in S.
This ends the proof of Part (ii).
To prove Part (iii), we show that adding A6 leads to z n (:) being a single-valued and continuous function. From Amir (1996a), Theorem 2.1, we know that the best-response correspondence e x (y; S), as de…ned in (1), is nonincreasing given that P (Z; S) is log-concave in Z. In addition, since every selection of e Z (y; S) increases in y (Lemma 1) and e Z (y; S) = e x (y; S) + y, it follows that every selection of e x (y; S) has all its slopes bounded below by 1. Altogether then, all the slopes of every selection of e x (y; S) lie in [ 1; 0] . This leads to the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium through a well-known argument, a proof of which is given in Amir and Lambson (2000), Theorem 2.3. Hence, z n (:) is single-valued. Since z n (:) is also u.h.c. as a correspondence, due to …rms' payo¤s being continuous in S, the conclusion follows.
Proof of Lemma 4
By de…nition, an industry output of 0 is a FECE if 0 The proof of Theorem 5 calls for several intermediate results, which will turn out to be useful for some other proofs as well. We …rst state su¢ cient conditions under which an increasing selection of z n (S) is di¤erentiable for almost all S, and give a speci…c functional form for its slope. We then show that when 0 is part of the equilibrium set, then z n (0) is single-valued and right-continuous.
Lemma 24 Assume A1-A5 are satis…ed. Let b z n be an increasing selection of z n (S), such that b z n (S) 2 (0; nK). Then b z n (S) is di¤ erentiable for almost all S; and its slope is given by
where b z n stands for b z n (S) :
Proof of Lemma 24
If b z n (S) is interior, it must satisfy the …rst order condition
where b
Lemma 25 Assume A1-A5 are satis…ed and C (:) is convex. De…ne
Given any n 2 N and S 2 [0; nK], if Z 0 2 arg max f (Z; S) : 0 Z nKg then Z 0 2 z n (S) :
Proof of Lemma 25
Assume Z is an argmax of (Z; S), we need to show Z corresponds to the industry output of a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with exogenous S. Let Z = x + y , with x = Z =n and y = (n 1) x , and consider Z 0 = x 0 + y , with x 0 2 [0; K] : Then x 0 denotes a possible deviation of a given …rm from its equilibrium output x : We next show this unilateral deviation is never pro…table.
Since Z is a maximizer of (Z; S) ; then (Z ; S) (Z 0 ; S), which is equivalent to say
Then we have
The …rst inequality follows from (24), after rearranging terms. The second one holds as we assumed C (:) is convex (and y = (n 1) x ), and the last one by A1, P 1 (Z; S) < 0: Since x 0 is arbitrary, this argument shows that x is a symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5
Part (i) holds because, if the trivial outcome (zero output) is not part of the equilibrium set, Theorem 2 guarantees there is a FECE with strictly positive industry output.
Parts (ii) and (iii) are both based on the following argument. By Lemma 3, the maximal and minimal selections of z n (S), z n (S) and z n (S), increase in S. , there is an S 0 S 00 nK such that z n (S 00 ) = S 00 : Since this condition implies z n (S 00 ) is a strictly positive FECE, the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium reduces to showing there is at least one S 2 (0; nK] for which an element of z n (S) is above S, i.e.
z n (S) S:
To prove Part (ii), we show z 0
Then the existence of a nontrivial FECE follows by the argument in the previous paragraph, as Lemma 6 and the property z 0 n (0) > 1; imply there exists a small " > 0 for which z n (") > ": This completes the proof of Part (ii). i 0 for all Z S: As a consequence, the largest argmax of (Z; S) must be larger than S. Call this argmax Z 0 . Our proof follows because Z 0 2 z n (S), by Lemma 25,  and this ensures there is an S 2 (0; nK] for which an element of z n (S) is higher than S:
Proof of Theorem 7
Under A1-A6 we know, by Lemma 3, that z n (:) is a single-valued, continuous and increasing function. The fact that f (Z; n) is equal to its slope along the diagonal, follows from a stronger version of Lemma 24 as follows. Consider (20) with z n (S) instead of b z n (S). By the implicit function theorem, @z n (S) =@S exists at every S and is given by (19) with b z n (S) replaced by z n (S).
Evaluating this along the diagonal Z = S, we see that it is equal to f (Z; n).
The uniqueness result now follows directly from the assumption f (Z; n) < 1 for all Z; since any two adjacent …xed points of z n (S) must include one for which f (Z; n) 1.
Proof of Proposition 10
By Lemma 3, z n (:) and z n (:) are increasing.
To prove Part (i), …rst assume 0 is not an equilibrium. Then z n (0) > 0 and the orbit in (8) with b z n = z n and S 0 = 0 (or S 0 near 0) must converge to the smallest …xed point of z n (:), which is a strictly positive equilibrium by (the successive approximation part of) Tarski's …xed point theorem.
Hence orbits with higher values of S 0 will converge to non-zero …xed points of z n (:) :
Next, assume Condition (ii) of Theorem 5 holds. Then we know that z n (S) > S for S small enough (cf. Lemma 6) . So any orbit with S 0 near 0 converges to the smallest …xed point of z n (:) with strictly positive output, and orbits with higher values of S 0 are as in the previous step.
To prove Part (ii), Condition (iii) of Theorem 5 ensures there is an S 0 2 (0; nK] for which z n (S 0 ) S 0 . By Tarski's Theorem applied to z n mapping [S 0 ,nK] to itself, the orbit starting at S 0 must converge to a strictly positive equilibrium.
To prove Part (iii), note that since 0 is a FECE, there can be no other FECE by Theorem 7.
Hence, every orbit from any S 0 is a decreasing sequence to 0.
Proof of Theorem 12
To prove Part (i), we use the mapping (18) in the proof of Lemma 3. We know, by Topkis's theorem, that the maximal and minimal selections of T n , T n and T n ; exist. Furthermore, the largest value of z n (S), z n (S), constitutes the largest …xed point of T n . Since (n 1) =n increases in n every selection of T n is increasing. Then the largest …xed point of T n , z n (S) ; is also increasing in n [Theorem A.4, Appendix]. A similar argument, using the selection T n , establishes that z n (S)
is increasing in n.
The second statement of Part (i) follows directly from De…nition 11 and the fact that z n (S) and z n (S) shift up as n increases.
To prove Part (ii), observe that if the trivial equilibrium holds and P 1 (0; 0) + P 2 (0; 0) 0, then, by Lemma 6, z 0 n (0) < 1 8 n, so that 0 is a stable equilibrium 8 n. This ends our proof.
Proof of Theorem 13
The maximal and minimal selections of B n (as de…ned in the proof of Theorem 2) denoted, respectively, B n and B n ; exist by Topkis's theorem. Furthermore, the largest equilibrium values of y n and Z n , y n ; Z n , constitute the largest …xed point of B n . Since (n 1) =n is increasing in n, B n is increasing in n for all (y; S). Since B n is also increasing in both y and S, the largest …xed point of B n ; y n ; Z n ; is also increasing in n (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) . A similar argument, using the selection B n ; establishes that y n ; Z n increases in n as well. This shows part (i).
Part (ii) follows directly from Part (i) since dP (Z; Z) =dz = P 1 (Z; Z) + P 2 (Z; Z) :
Proof of Theorem 14
Consider the following mapping
Then M n maps industry output into the solution of a …ctitious …rst order condition, which coincides with that of an interior FECE when x = Z=n and Z = Z n :
Totally di¤erentiating this …rst order condition with respect to n; we have
Substituting in (26) e x by [C 0 (Z=n) P (Z; Z)] =P 1 (Z; Z) ; and rearranging terms, we get
Substituting g (Z) from (9) into (27), we get
By A1, P 1 (Z; Z) < 0. Also, by Theorem 13 (i), the extremal equilibrium industry outputs increase in n: Then, if g (Z) ( ) 0 over Z n ; Z n+1 , the mapping M n increases (decreases) in n at the largest equilibrium industry output. Theorem 14 follows because if M n increases (decreases) in n at the largest equilibrium industry output, then x n also increases (decreases) with this parameter.
By a similar argument it can be shown that this is also true for x n .
Proof of Corollary 15
Inequality 10 equals function g (Z) when the …rms face no cost of production. Then the …rst claim follows directly from Theorem 14 (i).
The …rst term in the left hand side of (10) is always positive by A5. As the log-convexity of P (Z; S) in Z guarantees the second term is also positive, this is a su¢ cient condition for the required inequality.
Proof of Theorem 16
Consider the following inequalities n+1 = x n+1 P x n+1 + y n+1 ; Z n+1 C (x n+1 )
x n P x n + y n+1 ; Z n+1 C (x n )
x n P x n+1 + y n+1 ; Z n+1 C (x n )
x n P x n + y n ; Z n C (x n ) = n :
The …rst inequality follows by the Cournot equilibrium property. The second one is from x n+1 x n and A1. (The fact that x n+1 x n here follows by Theorem 14 (i) because we assumed all its required conditions are satis…ed.) The third inequality follows because our assumptions imply P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 P Z n ; Z n : Therefore, n+1 n : By a similar argument it can be shown that this is also true for the equilibrium per-…rm pro…ts evaluated at the minimal equilibrium outputs.
This shows Part (i).
We omit the proof of Part (ii) as it is almost identical to the previous one.
Proof of Corollary 17
If P 11 (Z; Z)+P 12 (Z; Z) = 0, then g (Z) = P 1 (Z; Z) [P 1 (Z; Z) + P 2 (Z; Z)] : By A1, P 1 (Z; Z) < 0. Then the sign of g (Z) is equal to the sign of P 1 (Z; Z) + P 2 (Z; Z), and Corollary 17 (i) and (ii) follow by Theorems 14 (i) and 16 (i), respectively.
Proof of Theorem 18
To show Part (i) consider
The …rst inequality follows because P t; Z n+1 A (x n+1 ) 0 for all t Z n+1 , and Z n+1 Z n by Theorem 13 (i). The second inequality holds by the assumed conditions.
To show Part (ii) let us de…ne V n (x; S) = R nx 0 P (t; S) dt nC (x) : Notice V n (x; S) is concave in x since n [nP 1 (nx; S) C 00 (x)] < 0 by both A1 and A4. In addition, (29) where the inequality follows by A1. The following steps show our result Z nxn 0 P t; Z n+1 dt nC (x n ) = n+1 + V n x n+1 ; Z n+1 V n x n ; Z n+1 n+1 + @V n x n+1 ; Z n+1 =@x (x n+1 x n ) = n+1 + n P nx n+1 ; Z n+1 C 0 (x n+1 ) (x n+1 x n ) n+1 + n P (n + 1) x n+1 ; Z n+1 C 0 (x n+1 ) (x n+1 x n ) 0:
The …rst inequality follows from inequality (29) , the second one by A1 and Theorem 13 (i) and the third one by the concavity of V n (x; S) in x: The fourth inequality holds by A1 and because we assumed x n+1 x n , and the last one by the Cournot property. This completes our proof.
Proof of Corollary 19
If the cost of production is linear, the right hand side of the required condition in Theorem 18 (i) is zero. Its left hand side is always positive because Z n+1 Z n and, by A1, P 2 (Z; S) > 0. Our result follows because these two facts ensure Theorem 18 (i) is satis…ed.
Proof of Theorem 20
The proof of Part (i) follows directly from Theorem 13 (i).
The following steps prove Part (ii)
CS n+1 CS n = Z Z n+1 0 P t; Z n+1 P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 dt Z Zn 0 P t; Z n P Z n ; Z n dt Z Zn 0 P t; Z n+1 P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 dt Z Zn 0 P t; Z n P Z n ; Z n dt = Z n P Z n ; Z n P Z n+1 ; Z n Z Zn 0 P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 P Z n+1 ; Z n P t; Z n+1 P t; Z n dt Z n P Z n ; Z n P Z n+1 ; Z n 0:
The …rst inequality follows directly from P 1 (Z; S) < 0 and Theorem 13 (i). The next step is obtained from the previous one by adding and subtracting R Zn 0 P Z n+1 ; Z n dt; and rearranging terms: To justify the second inequality notice that P 12 (Z; S) 0 is su¢ cient for Z Zn 0 P t; Z n+1 P t; Z n dt Z Zn 0 P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 P Z n+1 ; Z n dt:
Our last step is true since P 1 (Z; S) < 0.
Hence, P 12 (Z; S) 0 8 Z; S 2 [0; nK] is su¢ cient for CS n+1 CS n 0; or CS n+1 CS n :
Proof of Theorem 21
For an extremal equilibrium industry output, consider (n + 1) n+1 n n = Z n+1 P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 A (x n+1 ) Z n P Z n ; Z n A (x n ) Z n P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 A (x n+1 ) Z n P Z n ; Z n A (x n ) = Z n [P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 P Z n ; Z n ] [A (x n+1 ) A (x n )] :
Since P Z n+1 ; Z n+1 A (x n+1 ) 0, the inequality follows by Theorem 13 (i). The …rst part of Theorem 21 simply says that if the last function is positive, then (n + 1) n+1 n n : This shows Part (i). Part (ii) follows directly from Theorem (16) (i) so we omit it.
Proof of Corollary 22
This result follows directly from Theorem 21 (i), because linear cost implies constant average cost of production.
APPENDIX
In an attempt to make this paper self-contained, we provide a summary of all lattice-theoretic notions and results used here. Since this paper deals with real decision and parameter spaces, every theorem that follows is a special case of the original one (see Topkis, 1998) .
A function F : R 2 + ! R is supermodular if, for x 1 x 2 ; y 1 y 2 , F (x 1 ; y 1 ) F (x 2 ; y 1 ) F (x 1 ; y 2 ) F (x 2 ; y 2 ) :
If F is twice continuously di¤erentiable, Topkis's (1978) Characterization Theorem says that supermodularity is equivalent to @ 2 F @x@y 0; for all x, y. Furthermore, @ 2 F @x@y > 0 implies that F is strictly supermodular, the latter notion being de…ned by a strictly inequality in (30) . Supermodularity is usually interpreted as a complementarity property: Having more of one variable increases the marginal returns to having more of the other variable.
F has the single-crossing property or SCP in (x; y) if, for x 1 x 2 ; y 1 y 2 ,
F (x 1 ; y 1 ) F (x 2 ; y 2 ) 0 =) F (x 1 ; y 2 ) F (x 2 ; y 1 ) 0
Note that (30) implies (31) , while the converse is generally not true. Additionally, (30) is a cardinal notion while (31) is ordinal. Thus, the SCP is sometimes also referred to as ordinal supermodularity. Our equilibrium comparisons are based on the following result (Milgrom and Roberts,1990) .
] be an increasing function, 8t, such that B t (x) is also increasing in t, 8x. Then the minimal and maximal …xed-points of B t are increasing in t.
